Jan 18

by Ruth Lee

Last week’s news out of Massachusetts is illustrative of what is becoming the normal climate for our industry. Our first read of the story came on Friday, January 7 from American Banker reporters Kate Berry and Jeff Horwitz.

According to that article, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected claims by two major banking institutions that they did not need to prove themselves the authorized mortgage holders at the time each foreclosed on properties in that state. Ironically, or perhaps for the Court’s purposes symbolically, the foreclosures considered were executed on the same day in the summer of 2007.

HousingWire’s Jacob Gaffney this week aptly examined investor and analyst responses to the ruling. I’d recommend reading it.

Nonetheless, while we tend to agree that the impact of the Massachusetts ruling on the securitization industry is likely negligible, we see other facets of portent to it. Admittedly preferring to read the tea leaves versus just drinking the brew, we see guidance from the Massachusetts court that can benefit mortgage lenders of every description.

We see three distinct messages:

  • States and their multi-state initiatives have teeth they are ready to use in 2011;
  • Best-effort mortgage documentation is just not good enough; and
  • Timeliness of lending protocols will be scrutinized.

First, this ruling by a state court steeped in the tradition of protecting its citizens’ rights is a much-needed reminder that our industry is regulated both at the state and Federal level. Mortgage lenders of every breed – banks, mortgage bankers (retail, wholesale and correspondent alike) and mortgage brokers – are bound by the laws and interpretations of the states in which they do business.

This is especially germane for multi-state lenders operating under a complex matrix of regulation and scrutiny. Beginning in 2011, as we’ve said before [Read Here], multi-state lenders are subject to coordinated cross-jurisdictional audits. The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR) hammered out the Nationwide Cooperative Agreement for Mortgage Supervision (NCA). NCA includes eExams for compliance checks with HMDA, TILA, HOEPA, RESPA, plus relevant high-cost, anti-predatory and consumer credit mandates.

Second, the Massachusetts ruling tells us that documentation matters. Not merely “best effort” documentation, but accurate, complete and timely documentation. The distinction is important, even though to us it reeks of common sense, because it appears from the unfolding of the Massachusetts’ scenarios that both banks, when given the opportunity to rectify title record on the properties in question, produced plenty of documentation.

None of it met the court’s standards because the documentation was irrelevant to its request that clear proof of authority related to the mortgages be established. Since it is highly (we pray) unlikely that banks of sophistication and reputation would purposefully attempt to mislead or skirt the intent of the court, we deduce that these institutions did not comprehend the incompleteness and inadequacy of their documents. In other words, business as usual would appear to be sloppy documentation.

State courts do not approve.

My third and final takeaway from the Massachusetts salvo to the mortgage industry is that timeliness in executing mortgage lending, mortgage assignments, mortgage securitization, mortgage servicing and mortgage foreclosure protocols (and business process management) will be taken seriously by state courts. Authority to take actions related to mortgage loans will be based on timeliness.

Although it sounds ludicrous to the average Jane, it appears that neither the banks, nor the servicer used by both, saw anything prohibitive or unusual in the fact that clear title to foreclosed properties had not been established according to state law. This says volumes about how far off the mark our industry can be in understanding the judicial system’s perspective.

Heretofore, our industry has tolerated a loose interpretation of timeliness throughout mortgage origination to closing to post-closing, secondary marketing and securitization to servicing. Henceforth, if you read the Massachusetts ruling the way we are inclined to, timeliness and accuracy will make or break mortgage lending practices.

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Sep 04

by Mary Kladde

There is good news and not-so-good news in our industry.  The good news is that common sense appears to be gaining ground as the business model of choice for U.S. residential lending.  That’s right, after almost totaling its viability as an economic engine, and compromising itself embarrassingly for a chance at Wall Street grade greed, the U.S. mortgage industry – public, private and non-profit players – is grappling with its own discipline issues.

From my perspective the most promising sign of this is found in Fannie Mae’s Loan Quality Initiative (LQI), which begins to address the legacy weaknesses and opportunities for mischief that persist in mortgage lending processes.  The net result of LQI implies that pre-closing and pre-funding loan review are to become de rigueur, as will pre-purchase loan review. Another step in the right direction is the collaborative effort between the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR) to develop the Nationwide Cooperative Agreement for Mortgage Supervision (NCA). 

Compliance Ease co-founder Jason Roth has written an informed article about this collaboration in the September issue of Secondary Marketing Executive, but in summary, its standardized, data-intensive, multi-state approach to monitoring and auditing lenders will make it more difficult to conceal and easier to regulate mortgage lending compliance violations.

The not-so-good news is that our industry, its regulators, and policy makers continue to mistake the symptoms of our disarray for its causes.  The problem, from my personal perspective as a mortgage lending back office service provider to lenders of every size and stripe, is that this industry flies with its eyes wide shut.

And it is not for lack of data. We’ve got more data than we can deal with, literally.

As a result, we are part of a supply chain trying to assemble investable financial instruments whose underlying terms and conditions are not accurately reflected in their recordkeeping. This means that investors cannot rely on the loan files they receive from lenders unless they conduct a comprehensive loan level review, including documents.  If investors are going as a matter of policy to conduct loan level review, lenders must prepare for the scrutiny via their own loan review processes.

There is a fundamental disconnect in the mortgage lending lifecycle that will thwart even the most well intentioned common sense initiatives.  What good is data validation, even if conducted repeatedly by both the loan originator and the purchaser, if the data in the LOS does not process straight through to DU to correctly populate the appropriate document sets?

A stubborn dilemma remains.  Lenders are adding data to DU from their platforms but oftentimes loan closing documents are not synced with that data.  Clearly, if DU is taking into consideration data that is not recognizable and manageable by lenders’ doc prep systems, the document sets on these loans will be unreliable reflections of their underlying conditions.

This, in my view, reduces DU to little more than a placebo by which many in our industry will be placated into believing once again that the emperor’s new clothes are glorious and impervious to error. We need standardization of loan processing data for underwriting and accurate documentation, and every lender should be girding themselves for 100% loan level review throughout the loan and securitization lifecycle.

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Sep 19

I read an opinion piece today entitled: OUR OPINION: Regulating resistance in mortgage industry. My problem with this article is it’s misunderstanding of the mortgage industry and of the way regulatory bodies can and should be acting to support a market rebound. The author writes:

“Government regulation in a free market economy can be stifling but if the actions – or, more accurately, inactions – of the nations’ lenders in helping ease the foreclosure crisis is any indication, it’s time to bring the hammer down on those who continue to prey on vulnerable homebuyers.”

And goes on to say:

“Massachusetts approach to loan modification has been three-pronged: a) assess the borrower’s ability to pay, which is a no-brainer first step in any credible loan program; b) compare the value of the income stream to projected foreclosure losses; and c) push lenders for loan modifications that serves the borrower’s needs while meeting the servicer’s economic interest.

Why is that so controversial or difficult? The answer is because predatory lenders make their money on loan origination fees, which generally are not part of a loan modification.”

As I said, my main concern with this article is the nonsense about origination fees being the reason that predatory lenders don’t modify loans… that is just not understanding the industry.   Servicers don’t participate in origination often… they make money on the fees that are charged.    For a while the reason that they couldn’t just modify the loan is because they don’t OWN the loan…they own the servicing rights – or the right to collect payments and fees associated with that … they pay the escrows (taxes and insurance) and handle the 1098s etc… but they don’t make money on origination – that is a primary market transaction…while servicing is squarely in the secondary.  Laws have freed up the statutory ability of the servicer to perform these actions…but they again…DON’T OWN the loan… they have to get permission from the owners to just cede 20-30% of the value of the asset to the distressed borrower for tax purposes and out of the goodness of their heart.

Essentially, if you lend your brother in law $100,000 dollars…which he is supposed to pay $1000 per month on.    He used his IRA as collateral.  The IRA, which when you lent the money was worth $150,000 is now worth $75,000.    The brother in law stops paying the loan.  Now brother in law comes to you and says… ok… I can’t make the payment – so can you just reduce what I owe you to the value of my collateral or $75K… basically just give me 25K.  And I would like for you to reduce my interest rate and re-amortize the payment to the new principal balance.  The reason I would do this would be because if I foreclose on the collateral …and require my BIL to liquidate his IRA… I know that I am not going to get the full $75K after penalties and fees.  But I also have no idea if my BIL will even pay the loan at the lesser rate… and now I have a smaller equity position.  Now what if the money wasn’t yours that you lent the BIL… what if it was from a family inheritance… you would need to get permission from them to just reduce the principal amount owed.


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